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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1951-1952
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAIABIATY OF REMEDIES
Only one case seems to have dealt directly with the jurisdic-
tional power of state tribunals to entertain causes.' It was noted,
in Keel v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Colnpany,2 that, while a state
court would have the power to determine the right of a railroad
employee to recover damages for an alleged wrongful discharge
from his employment, it would lack authority to order his rein-
statement in view of the exclusive character of the grievance pro-
cedure set forth in the federal Railroad Labor Act s Federal
courts sitting in Illinois, however, are not, under the holding in
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Dines, Inc., 4 to be
considered bound by the restrictions in the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act,5 a section of which purports to forbid the maintenance
of suits in this state on certain types of wrongful deaths occurring
elsewhere. As the holding of the United States Supreme Court
therein would appear to have rejected any thought of a difference
between the Illinois statute and the one from Wisconsin, pre-
viously considered to be unconstitutional in the case of Hughes v.
Fetter,6 the decision would also appear to have freed state courts
in Illinois from any similar restraint.
While no serious issues of consequence have arisen regard-
ing the acquisition of jurisdiction over the parties to litigation, or
the time within which suit must be brought, venue provisions
being what they areJ three decisions during the year may be
I The Appellate Court, in Parkin v. Damen-Ridge Apartments, Inc., 344 Ili. App.
301, 100 N. E. (2d) 632 (1951), reaffirmed the proposition that a state court has
concurrent jurisdiction with a federal court in a matter arising under a federal
statute in the absence of an express limitation therein reserving jurisdiction to the
federal courts.
2346 Ill. App. 169, 104 N. E. (2d) 659 (1952).
3 45 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq.
4342 U. S. 396. 72 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. Ed. 441 (1952), reversing 190 F. (2d) 493
(1951). Reed and Frankfurter, JJ., each wrote a dissenting opinion.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
6341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951), noted in 30 CHicAGO-KENT
LAw REViaw 174.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 131, provides generally for suit In the
county of the defendant's residence but permits suit in a county "in which the
transaction or some part thereof" occurTed.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
considered important for the light they shed on the place where
suit must be brought." In the first, that of First National Bank of
Lacon v. Bauer Poultry Corporation,9 a suit based on a check
issued and delivered in Cook County and drawn on a bank located
there, the plaintiff, a transferee for value of such check who took
the same by negotiation in Marshall County, was permitted to
maintain his action in Marshall County, primarily because the
defendant's motion to transfer the cause 10 was not filed until
after a general appearance had been made." The Appellate Court
for the Second District did, however, there intimate that it con-
sidered the act of negotiation to be a sufficient part of the trans-
action to meet venue requirements. In a somewhat similar case,
that of Winn v. Vogel, 12 the Appellate Court for the Fourth Dis-
trict sustained defendant's objection that he ought not be sued
in Williamson County on a check issued in, and drawn on a bank
in, Douglas County, where defendant also resided, even though
deposited for collection by the payee in Williamson County, since
the act of deposit in the latter county occurred between the payee
and a third person and was not, therefore, part of the transaction
between the parties to the suit. The third case, that of Christopher
v. West,18 followed the line of some earlier decisions 14 for the
Appellate Court for the Third District there held that a suit in
Sangamon County, growing out of a real estate contract made in
Ford County for the sale of land in Iroquois County, observed
venue requirements because the abstract of title had been deliv-
ered for examination in Sangamon County and many of the con-
ferences between the parties regarding the clearing up of objec-
tions to title had occurred there.
s Ibid., Ch. 110, § 135, saves a judgment entered in the wrong county if no protest
is made.
9 345 Ill. App. 315, 103 N. E. (2d) 160 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
10 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, § 36.
11 Iles v. Heidenreich, 271 Ill. 480, 111 N. E. 524 (1916).
12345 Il. App. 425, 103 N. E. (2d) 673 (1952).
13 345 Ill. App. 515, 104 N. E. (2d) 309 (1952).
14 See LaHam v. Sterling Canning Co., 321 Il1. App. 32, 52 N. E. (2d) 467 (1943),
noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT L4AW REvIEw 208, and Schmelzle v. Transportation Inv.
Co., 341 Ill. App. 639, 94 N. E. (2d) 682 (1951).
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If jurisdictional requirements have been observed, so that
no attack may be made on the basis thereof, the defendant should
be conscious of the fact that provisions have been made, in the
Civil Practice Act, for the filing of an appearance and a demand
for jury trial, all within a limited period of time,' 5 although the
court may, for good cause shown, grant an extension of time for
the taking of any other step in the case such as the filing of a
motion or an answer. 16 The decision in Vail v. City of Paris 17
should serve as warning not to delay the entry of appearance,
and particularly not the demand for jury trial if one is desired,
even though the court may see fit to extend time for other pur-
poses, for it was there held proper to strike a late request for
jury trial despite the fact the same had been presented within the
period fixed by an extension of time in which to answer. The
prior liberal holdings in Stephens v. Kastens 1s and in Mason v.
Continental Distributing Company, Inc.,19 were distinguished on
the basis the facts thereof showed an extenuation for the delay.
Few questions have been generated regarding the proper par-
ties to litigation but, even where permitted,20 the use of third-
party practice is not without limitation, judging by the holding in
the case of Western Contractors Supply Company v. T. P. Dowdle
Company.21 The plaintiff there, suing in the Municipal Court of
Chicago for the price of goods sold and delivered, found himself
embroiled in a dispute between the original defendant and a third
party, added pursuant to rule of court,22 who had allegedly con-
verted the goods so sold at some time later than the dates men-
tioned in plaintiff's statement of claim. The Appellate Court, on
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188 and § 259.8.
16 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 183.
1T 344 Ill. App. 590, 101 N. E. (2d) 861 (1951).
18383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
19 333 Ill. App. 128, 76 N. E. (2d) 780 (1948).
20 The provisions of the Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 149, regarding the bringing of new parties into suits pending in courts regulated
by that statute, do not appear to be broad enough to authorize a general application
of third-party practice. See 28 CHicAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 33.
21 346 Ill. App. 17, 104 N. E. (2d) 826 (1952).
22 Rule 25 of that court specifically sanctions the use of third-party practice. It
is modelled on Federal Rule 14.
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finding that the dispute between the defendants in no way related
to the plaintiff's case nor involved any element by which the third-
party defendant could be said to be liable for "all or part" of
plaintiff's claim, ruled the addition of the third-party defendant
to be improper, reversed the judgment pronounced against such
party, and directed that it be dismissed from the case.
In the absence of significant cases regarding the availability
of legal remedies, a few cases concerning the scope of equitable
proceedings may be mentioned.23 According to Coven Distribut-
ing Company, Inc. v. City of Chicago,24 neither an injunction pro-
ceeding nor one for declaratory judgment would be the proper
vehicle to determine the legality of certain automatic amusement
devices, for the operation of which the city had there refused
a license on the assumption they were instruments to be used
for gambling. Mandamus was said to be more appropriate for
this purpose. In much the same way, it was held, in Bloome v.
Juergensmeyer,25 that a court of equity would have no general
jurisdiction to test the title to a public office, or to prevent the
officer from performing his functions, at least not until proceed-
ings had been otherwise conducted to determine his right to the
office.
An equity court should also be slow to grant a temporary
injunction against the enforcement of a statute by a properly
constituted public official, although this may sometimes become
necessary to preserve the status quo. The case of Thillens, Inc.
v. Cooper 26 illustrates one circumstance where injunctive relief
might be considered to be appropriate. The plaintiff there, oper-
ating certain ambulatory currency exchanges, contended that com-
pliance with the 1951 amendments to the Community Currency
23 See ante, Division I, Business Organizations, notes 1 to 4, for discussion of
Champan v. Barton, 345 Ill. App. 110, 102 N. E. (2d) 565 (1951), dealing with the
power of an equity court to prevent an interference with the management of an
Illinois corporation. See also post, Division VI, Property, notes 25 to 29, for the
case of Jonas v. Meyers, 410 III. 213, 101 N. E. (2d) 509 (1951), which deals with
equitable Jurisdiction to reform a mistake in a deed.
24346 ni1. App. 448, 105 N. E. (2d) 137 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
25344 Ill. App. 625, 101 N. E. (2d) 851 (1951).
26 345 I1. App. 145, 102 N. E. (2d) 562 (1952).
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Exchange Act 27 would require the obtaining of approximately
eight hundred individual licenses, would force plaintiff to dis-
continue business, and would produce an irreparable loss, hence
was impossible to obey. The Appellate Court, recognizing the
desirability of preserving the status quo until a test could be made
of the constitutionality of the amendments, approved the granting
of a temporary injunction.
The granting or withholding of an injunction may also be
made to turn on questions of public interest. It was on that basis
that the Appellate Court approved the decree in People v. Metro-
politan Disposal Company,28 conceiving it to be in the paramount
interest of the adjoining village, as well as of nearby property
owners, that a garbage dump should be filled in rapidly under the
supervision of a sanitation engineer. It did not, however, appear
to take into consideration the interests of the population of a large
city, utilizing the pit in question, to a more orderly method for
garbage disposal.
The improper securing of a temporary injunction may be
attended with an obligation to pay damages upon its later dissolu-
tion, 29 but the case of Lake County v. Cuneo 80 suggests an im-
portant qualification on that doctrine when the petitioner is a
quasi-public corporation and a subdivision of the state. Bearing
in mind that the state and its subdivisions are not generally liable
for damages arising from a tort inflicted on an individual, the
court there refused to approve an allowance for damages growing
out of a wrongfully-obtained injunction which the county had
secured against the individual property owner, particularly since
the injunction had been sought in connection with the county's
governmental function of enforcing certain zoning ordinances.
Class suits, being solely of equitable cognizance in this state,
are marked by certain equitable principles regulating the right
of one, or a few, to maintain such actions on behalf of others. In
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 16 , § 30 et seq.
28345 Ill. App. 570, 104 N. E. (2d) 107 (1952).
29 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
30344 Ill. App. 242, 100 N. E. (2d) 521 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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Kimbrough v. Parker,3 1 however, the court found an observance
of these principles so it upheld the right of the plaintiffs to pro-
ceed with a representative action. The case was one in which
some five contestants, participating in a puzzle contest conducted
under the auspices of the defendants, instituted a class suit for
the benefit of numerous others in order to have a trust imposed
upon the proceeds because of the defendant's fraudulent dealings
therewith. Inasmuch as there was a common fund to which all
contributions flowed, and the contestants were many in number,
but the inducements offered each were substantially identical, a
class suit was deemed to be appropriate, particularly since there
was no conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and those whom
they sought to represent.
The rapid use which has been made of the quasi-equitable
proceeding for a declaratory judgment, 82 a remedy strictly sui
generis in character, reveals that the bar is not entirely familiar
with some restrictions adhering thereto. In Goodyear Rubber
Company v. Tierney,3 3 for example, it was necessary for the Su-
preme Court to point out that, where another and long-standing
statutory remedy is already available,34 recourse should not be
had to the proceeding for a declaration of rights. The case of
Lentin v. Continental Assurance Company,35 by contract, indi-
cates how close is the parallel between a declaratory judgment
proceeding and an equitable action for reformation. It having
been there determined, in a suit over the effective date of an in-
surance policy, that reformation was not needed but that a con-
struction and clarification of ambiguous language was enough to
settle the dispute, the Supreme Court approved the use made of
a declaratory judgment action against the objection that a true
suit in equity was the only proper and available method for the
securing of relief.
31344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N. E. (2d) 617 (1951).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
33411 Ill. 421, 104 N. E. (2d) 22 (1952), noted in 40 Il. B. J. 535.
34 In that instance, the remedy was one by way of objection to a tax sale, based
on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 675.
35412 Inl. 158, 105 N. E. (2d) 735 (1952). See also the discussion of the Insurance
features of this case ante, Division II, Contracts, notes 18 to 23.
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PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
While the Civil Practice Act purports to abolish the distinc-
tions which heretofore existed between the several forms of ac-
tion,36 it has not proceeded so far as to permit a pleader to allege
a case without giving due observance to the essential elements of
a cause of action, hence the pleader should, before preparing a
complaint, adopt a theory for his proposed suit and should check
the complaint, when drawn, against that theory to make sure he
has alleged every essential element. If he has failed in that re-
spect, he may, nevertheless, by accident, have stated a case on
some other theory, one which would be sufficient to sustain his
complaint against a motion to strike.3 7 It was on this basis that
the Appellate Court for the Second District, in Burr v. State
Bank of St. Charles,5 reversed a judgment sustaining a motion
to strike a complaint when it found the complaint was inade-
quate to state a cause of action as in trespass, the intended theory,
but was adequate for the purpose of stating what would formerly
have been an action in trespass on the case. If the complaint
is fatally defective on every possible theory, however, the court
must grant relief to the defendant, according to the holding in
Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, Inc.,8 9 and that whether
the point is urged by way of motion to strike, by motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or even for the first time
on appeal.
Some points have also been made with regard to the prep-
aration of defensive pleadings. The requirement that a pleader
should, in an answer, set forth as affirmative defenses those
matters likely to take the opposite party by surprise,4 ought
not be understood to mean that all such affirmative statements
are necessarily intended to shift the burden of proof, or to
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 155.
37 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 166(2), declares that no pleading shall be deemed bad In sub-
stance which "shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform" the
opposite party of the nature of the claim.
38344 Ill. App. 332, 100 N. E. (2d) 773 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
39346 Il. App. 493, 105 N. E. (2d) 557 (1952). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4).
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require the filing of a reply 4' under penalty of admission for
failure to deny,42 for certain of such matters, while affirmative
in form, are really no more than negations of material elements
of the plaintiff's case. It was for that reason that the court,
in Hestand v. Clark,43 refused to concede that the plaintiff had
admitted the facts contained in the defendant's answer, when
neglecting to move to strike the same, or to reply thereto, be-
because analysis revealed the alleged "affirmative" defenses
amounted to no more than a traverse of plaintiff's allegation of
freedom from contributory negligence. Although affirmative in
form, the allegations were treated as being nothing more than
special denials, to which no reply would be needed.
It could also be noted that a statutory provision for plead-
ing in quo warranto actions 44 is much like a provision of the Civil
Practice Act, one which permits the plaintiff to plead generally,
as in the case of allegations relating to the performance of con-
ditions precedent, and puts the responsibility on the defendant
to point out precisely wherein the plaintiff may have failed to
perform.45 These provisions, however, do not deny to the plain-
tiff the right to be specific if he chooses. If he should be specific,
a problem could be generated as to the manner in which the de-
fendant should respond. The Appellate Court for the Second
District, in the quo warranto case of People ex rel. Koch v. Wil-
son,46 has now indicated, for the first time in Illinois, that the
defendant is entitled to be content with a denial of plaintiff's
specific allegations and is not required to make his answer in the
same form as would be necessary if plaintiff bad pleaded in a
more general fashion. It was there held to be error to strike an
answer which did not set out the facts by way of justification for
the defendant's assumption of civil authority because the plain-
41 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 156, states: "When new matter by way of defense or counter-
claim is pleaded in the answer, a reply shall be filed by the plaintiff."
42 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 164(2).
43 345 Ill. App. 480, 103 N. E. (2d) 652 (1952).
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 112, § 11.
45 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.13(3).
46346 Ill. App. 175, 104 N. E. (2d) 559 (1952).
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tiff, by elaborate specification, had already indicated the basis
of the alleged illegal assumption of power. A mere denial was,
therefore, considered sufficient to generate the issues to be tried.
While it is not generally necessary that pleadings should be
verified,47 there are times when the law requires the filing of
sworn pleadings. s A failure to observe such a requirement might
well result in an admission for want of proper contest. If not,
then the failure should be sufficient, according to Lindquist v.
Village of Island Lake,49 to justify the striking of the unverified
pleading.
Inasmuch as pleaders are only human and, for that reason,
do commit error, it should be expected that liberality would be
displayed in the matter of permitting amendments to pleadings
in order that a party should be able to get a decision on the merits
of the claim, or defense, intended to be offered,50 and this even
though the amendment may not occur until after the statute of
limitations had run, provided the action had been begun in time.
5 '
The holding of the Appellate Court for the Third District in the
case of In re Schafer's Estate52 is, therefore, to be commended
for the court there held it to be error to deny permission to amend
a claim filed in certain probate proceedings 53 when the only
purpose of the proposed amendment was to cure a misnomer
which had occurred and was not intended to enlarge upon the de-
mand being asserted.54 An amendment intended, after trial, to
change the cause from an equitable proceeding into a law suit
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 159, is permissive in form with respect
to verification of the initial pleading in the case.
48 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(7), relating to the
vacation of a final Judgment entered as by default.
49 344 Ill. App. 400, 101 N. D. (2d) 120 (1951).
50 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170.
51 But see note in 24 CHIAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 170 on the point of the right to
add new parties after the limitation period has expired.
52 Sub nom. Schafer v. Johnson, 344 Ill. App. 608, 101 N. E. (2d) 853 (1951).
53 The provisions of the Civil Practice Act are incorporated into the Probate Act
by reference: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 155.
54 See also Thomas v. Douglas, 346 Ill. App. 277, 105 N. E. (2d) 129 (1952), where
the amendment, offered after the period of limitation had expired, was intended to
more fully disclose the liability of a defendant who had been named in the caption,
and who had been served and had appeared, but who had not been named in the
body of the complaint. The amendment was held both proper and retroactive.
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for damages, however, was held properly denied in Bartman v.
Bartman5 5 when it appeared that the finding of the chancellor as
to the non-existence of the alleged contract relied upon had mili-
tated against the possibility of either legal or equitable relief.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
Three cases throw some light on procedure antecedent to the
trial itself. One, the lamented holding of the Supreme Court in
Agran v. Checker Taxi Company,56 has served to strike down, as
unconstitutional, the recent amendments to the Civil Practice
Act 57 intended to prevent the rendition of an ex parte judgment,
such as one for dismissal for want of prosecution, by surprise
and without warning.58 Another, that of Harwood v. Harwood,59
extends the summary judgment procedure of the Civil Practice
Act60 to ejectment proceedings, although another section thereof
would purport to exclude such proceedings from the operation
of that statute."' In the third, that of Zegarski v. Ashland Sav-
ings & Loan Association,6 2 the point was raised, but not decided,
that evidence obtained by pre-trial discovery or deposition could
not be utilized in support of a motion for summary judgment.
While noting that the point was a novel one, as yet undetermined,
the court avoided settling the problem by finding the affidavits
55411 Ill. 487, 104 N. E. (2d) 296 (1952).
56412 Ill. 145, 105 N. E. (2d) 713 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
383.
57 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172, § 174(6), and § 174a.
58 The Supreme Court may, however, have displayed considerable liberality in
providing for relief against such default judgments when, in Ellman v. DeRuiter,
412 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. (2d) 350 (1952), reversing 344 Ill. App. 557, 101 N. E. (2d)
630 (1951), it extended the scope of the motion In the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis, presented under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196, to cover
a situation where plaintiff's counsel had, apparently without any justification,
misled and lulled the defendant into a belief that no judgment had been taken until
it was too late to move to vacate the same. The court likened the motion to a
prayer for equitable treatment, not to be limited by those strictures which adhered
to the use of the common-law writ of error coram nobis.
59 412 Ill. 131, 105 N. E. (2d) 719 (1952).
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.
61 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125. It should be noted, however,
that the amendment to the Ejectment Act added in 1935, ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 45, § 50,
purports to make the provisions of the Civil Practice Act applicable to ejectment
actions.
62346 Ill. App. 535, 105 N. E. (2d) 792 (1952).
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,and counter-affidavits, offered at the summary judgment hearing,
to be sufficient to disclose a dispute as to the facts which required
denial of the motion for summary judgment and remandment of
the cause for trial.
Concerning proof itself, only a few instances of rules regu-
lating the introduction of evidence have any noteworthy aspects.6 3
In People v. Koseares,6 4 for example, proof that an alleged drawer
of a check was a fictitious person was made in a negative fashion.
The testimony was to the effect that the alleged maker had never
had an account with the bank on which the check was drawn;
that a search of telephone directories, and of lists of customers
for public utility services, in the vicinity disclosed no such person
listed; and a prominent citizen vouched for the fact that he
had never heard of a person bearing the name which had been
used on the check in question. The evidence was held competent,
although the court could find no prior Illinois decision squarely
on the point of the use which may be made of negative evidence
and had to rely on text authority as well as decisions from other
states.
In another criminal case, that of People v. Gougas,65 the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for murder because proof
had been made by the prosecution of the fact that the defendant
had a beneficial interest in an insurance policy on the life of his
alleged victim, which evidence had been introduced to support an
inference as to motive. The reversal was made necessary, the
court said, because the record failed to show that the defendant
knew, or could have known, of the existence of the insurance
policy.
One civil case having to do with impeachment of a witness
is worthy of comment. In the wrongful death case of Petersen
63 See post, Division IV, Criminal Law and Procedure, notes 8 to 12, for discus-
sion of the case of People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 106 N. E. (2d) 333 (1952),
regarding proof in cases of indirect contempt of court. Hereafter, such matters
will be determined by formal hearing at which customary proof methods will be
applicable in lieu of the doctrine of "purgation by oath" heretofore followed.
64410 Ill. 456, 102 N. E. (2d) 534 (1941).
65 410 Ill. 226, 101 N. E. (2d) 571 (1951).
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v. Midwest Transfer Company of Illinois,66 the legal representa-
tive sued both the employer and the truck driver. The latter, at
an inquest held before the suit, had made some damaging ad-
missions. The plaintiff first sought, at the trial of the civil case,
to establish these admissions by the testimony of the court re-
porter who had served at the inquest but the trial judge excluded
this evidence on the ground the truck driver was present in court.
This ruling was obviously erroneous, and was so held on appeal.
Plaintiff then called the truck driver as an adverse witness but,
when the trial judge demanded to know if plaintiff was willing
to waive the statutory dead-man's disqualification 7 as to "any-
thing that might have transpired before the coroner's jury,"
the plaintiff's counsel replied that he was not so willing. An
objection to the proposed interrogation of the truck driver was
then sustained. He was also forbidden, because of his incom-
petency, from appearing as a witness when he later sought to
testify in his own behalf.
The case becomes interesting because the Appellate Court,
without giving clear recognition to language in one of the cases
it cited, failed to notice that, under proper circumstances, the
truck driver may have been regarded as competent to testify,
at least as to part of the case. The court, in Merchants Loan &
Trust Company v. Egan,68 had recognized that one who was an
incompetent witness under the dead-man's act could be called as
a witness for the purpose of proving his admissions and, within
this limited area, could have been re-examined, despite his gen-
eral incompetence. If plaintiff's counsel had seen fit to place
a more precise limitation upon what he was willing to waive,
the witness might have been taken over the ground covered by
his admissions at the inquest and could then have denied, explained,
or negated some of the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. The
blanket refusal, following upon the grave error of the trial
judge in erroneously demanding a total waiver of the incom-
66 344 Ill. App. 167, 100 N. E. (2d) 388 (1951).
67 IU. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2.
68 222 Ill. 494, 78 N. E. 800 (1906).
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petency, represented bad strategy on counsel's part to say the
least.
Although not a novel decision, the holding of the Appellate
Court in Walker v. Shea-Matson Trucking Company 9 might also be
mentioned. It was there said to be error to give a jury instruction
couched in the language of a section of the Motor Vehicle Act
governing the right of way at intersections, 70 not so much because
"laying down the law in the words of the law itself" was error 71
but because the particular instruction was not made applicable to
the facts before the jury.
DAMAGES
The necessity for establishing a clear causal connection be-
tween the defendant's wrongful act and the alleged injury to
plaintiff was emphasized in the damage question propounded in
Ford v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company.72 The injured
plaintiff had there, apparently, recovered from the physical harm
sustained in an automobile accident when, some twenty-seven
months later, he suffered a cerebral thrombosis which resulted in a
total paralysis. Despite expert medical testimony, by both the
witnesses of the plaintiff and of the defendant, that a cerebral
thrombosis would have to develop in a far shorter period of time,
the trial court left the issue to the jury, which returned with a
large verdict against the defendant. A judgment thereon was
reversed by the Appellate Court for the Third District which held,
as a matter of law, that, in the absence of any conflicting testimony
on the point, the plaintiff had failed to establish the essential
causal connection. 73 In Olson v. Chicago Transit Authority,74 how-
ever, the Appellate Court for the First District accepted the jury's
verdict on the question of causation but did reverse the judgment
69344 Ill. App. 466, 101 N. E. (2d) 449 (1951), noted in 1 DePaul L. Rev. 301.
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95/_, § 165.
71 Mayer v. Springer, 192 I1. 270, 61 N. E. 725 (1916).
72344 Ill. App. 566, 101 N. E. (2d) 869 (1951).
73 The causal connection between the act and the harm was closer in point of
time, but still a matter of doubt, in Behles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 346 Ill.
App. 220, 104 N. E. (2d) 635 (1952), wherein leave to appeal was denied, but the
matter was said to be one for jury determination.
74 346 111. App. 47, 104 N. E. (2d) 542 (1952).
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for a new trial to be conducted solely on the issue as to the amount
of damages.
Damages in wrongful death cases are typically recovered, if
at all, by the legal representative of the deceased person's estate
who, under the statute, appears to be the only proper person to
maintain the action.75 The case of Thompson v. City of Bushnell,76
however, suggests an interesting possibility for augmenting the
recovery in such a case. A widow was there permitted, in her own
name and right, to secure the recovery of medical, hospital and
nursing expenses furnished to her husband prior to his death, as
well as for the expenses of his funeral, when the Appellate Court
for the Third District concluded that she could, under its interpre-
tation of the so-called "family expense" statute, have been held
liable therefor. Lacking local precedent on the point, the court
relied on the Oregon case of Hansen v. Hayes,77 a case in which
the common law duty of the husband to pay charges of that char-
acter was treated as supporting a correlative duty on the part of
the wife, thereby enabling her to secure reimbursement for ex-
penses forced upon her by defendant's wrong.
The right of one joint tort-feasor to have the benefit, by way
of mitigation of damages, for sums paid by other joint tort-f easors
for covenants not to sue has been fairly well settled,76 but some
question may exist as to the method to be pursued to take ad-
vantage of such fact.79  The case of Burns v. Stouffer80 would
appear to suggest that, if such a covenant should be given during
the course of a trial, the remaining defendant should seek permis-
T5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
76346 Ill. App. 352, 105 N. E. (2d) 311 (1952). A suit by the widow as adminis-
tratrix may be noted in Thompson v. City of Bushnell, 348 Ill. App. 395, 109 N. E.
(2d) 346 (1952), not in the period of this survey. In the cited case, the court
construed Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 15.
77175 Ore. 358, 154 P. (2d) 202 (1944).
78 See New York, Chicago & St. L. R. R Co. v. American Transit Lines, Inc., 408
IL. 338, 97 N. E. (2d) 264 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVInw 360, and
Aldridge v. Morris, 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted in 27
CMCAGo-KENT LAW RviEw 313.
79 In Smith v. Medendorp, 343 Ill. App. 512, 99 N. E. (2d) 571 (1951), for example,
it was held to be too late to raise the question by way of motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
80344 Ill. App. 105, 100 N. U. (2d) 507 (1951).
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sion to file a supplemental answer, 8' unless the plaintiff is willing
to waive the point, in order to provide a foundation for the offer
of proof regarding the amount so paid.
Issues concerning damage law in contract cases were also
presented during the year. It is the rule that the victim of a
broken sales contract may, at his option, tender performance and
sue for the contract price, or dispose of the goods at resale and
recover the deficit, if any, by way of suit for damages.8 2 If he
prefers the latter course, he should, in all fairness, do everything
possible to minimize the damage but, according to the case of
Corydon & Ohlrich, Inc. v. Kusper Bros. Company,83 he is under
no obligation to act to minimize damage until he has clear notice
of the breach. If, at that time, conditions have become such as to
make minimization of the damage impossible, as by a total collapse
of the market for the article in question, the seller is then entitled
to recover the sales price provided he has kept himself ready to
perform. The court there indicated that, under such circum-
stances, no other measure of damage could be calculated.
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
An extremely delicate issue concerning the propriety of judi-
cial conduct was generated during the year by the events occurring
in the course of the appeal taken in Glasser v. Essaness Theatres
Corporation.8 4 After the original opinion therein had been re-
leased, with one judge dissenting, a change was made in the con-
stitution of the division of the Appellate Court for the First
District which had heard the appeal, the two concurring judges
being transferred to another division and being replaced by two
others. A petition for rehearing was then filed and considered by
the reconstituted court which thereafter, with one dissent, sub-
stituted a new opinion and produced a directly opposite result to
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 163.
82 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, §§ 63-4.
83 345 Ill. App. 224, 102 N. E. (2d) 672 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
84 346 Ill. App. 72, 104 N. E. (2d) 510 (1952). Friend, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Leave to appeal has been granted. See also Weinrob v. Heintz, 346 Ill.
App. 30, 104 N. E. (2d) 534 (1952), involving the same problem.
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that attained at the first hearing. If the former justices had died
or had, by reason of the expiration of terms of office, ceased to
function, the action taken would have been the only possible way
to proceed to prevent an impasse. As they were, however, still
serving in the Appellate Court at the time the petition for rehear-
ing was considered, and could have been re-transferred for the
purpose of passing thereon, the unusual result, if sustained, could
form the basis for an imputation, no matter how unfounded, that
a tampering with the processes of justice had occurred.
Other aspects of the law regulating the review of cases have
been considered. Provision has been made in the Civil Practice
Act under which a party, on reversal of a judgment by an appellate
court, may secure further review before the Supreme Court if he
will certify that, on a new trial, he would have no further proof
to offer and is willing to stake his entire suit on the legal questions
contained in the record.8 5 The decision of the Supreme Court in
Lees v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company,8 6 however,
would indicate that resort to this provision would be improper if
the reason advanced to sustain the reversal in the appellate court
was such as to constitute only a partial defense to the suit. The
court there dismissed further review, taken pursuant to leave
granted on the basis mentioned, when it concluded there was an
unsettled question as to the sufficiency of the defendant's, rather
than the plaintiff's, proof which would have to be determined on
remandment, and until this point had been settled there was noth-
ing on which the Supreme Court could act.
The possibility that several judgments may be entered in the
one proceeding 7 has opened the door to questions concerning the
proper parties to an appellate proceeding. The plaintiff in
Beadles v. Servel, Incorporated,"8 had filed a complaint to recover
for personal injuries, naming two corporations as defendants.
One defendant moved to strike the complaint as to it and, when
85 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(2) (c).
86400 11. 536, 100 N. E. (2d) 653 (1951), noted in 1952 Ill. L. Forum 152.
Bristow and Maxwell, JJ., dissented.
87 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174.
88344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N. E. (2d) 405 (1951).
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such relief was granted and plaintiff elected to abide by the com-
plaint, the suit was dismissed in its favor. The other defendant
had likewise moved to strike the complaint but no ruling had been
made on that motion so the case, as to such defendant, remained
pending in the trial court. On appeal from the order of dismissal
as to the first defendant, the Appellate Court for the Third Dis-
trict held it to be error to make the second defendant a party to
the review proceedings, since there was no final order as to it, for
which reason a motion to dismiss the appeal as to such defendant
was sustained.
Although the provisions of the Civil Practice Act regarding
the time and manner of securing review, both of trial court and
appellate court decisions, are reasonably comprehensive, 9 it took
the case of Altschuler v. Altschuler9 ° to expose the fact that, in at
least one area, the statute appears to be inadequate. The case
was one concerning a partnership accounting in which some issues
regarding partnership realty were injected but, until the Appellate
Court for the First District rendered its opinion,9' it had not
really been decided that a freehold was involved. The plaintiff
thereupon filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
and also took out a writ of error. A motion was then made to
dismiss the writ of error on the ground that it had not been
obtained within the ninety-day limit purportedly established by
Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act,92 but the court refused to
grant such request, holding that the constitutional provision for
writ of error from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court
93
was not subject to any time limitation and, in the absence of
specific regulation, the practice at common law and in equity should
prevail.
94
If there may have been any doubt on the point, the holding in
89 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 199-202.
90410 I1. 169, 101 N. E. (2d) 552 (1951).
91 See Altschuler v. Altschuler, 340 Ill. App. 220, 91 N. E. (2d) 88 (1950).
92 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 200.
93 Il. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 11.
94 The Civil Practice Act does not purport to be all-inclusive: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125.
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Millikin Trust Company v. Morris9 5 now makes it clearly apparent
that the furnishing of a bond to cover costs in the reviewing court
is an essential prerequisite to an appeal from an interlocutory
order such as one granting a temporary injunction.96 For that
matter, the failure of an appellant to sign an appeal bond, prob-
ably from oversight, was deemed sufficient, in the case of In re
Hill's Estate,97 to justify dismissal of the appeal even though the
bonds had been signed by a competent surety. The court noted
that the case was one of first impression as to appeals in probate
matters but it followed an analogy provided in the case of appeals
from decisions of justices of the peace. 98
The rules of the Supreme Court concerning the content of the
abstract of the record and the brief on appeal would appear to be
clearly phrased, 99 yet litigants, or their counsel, have been more
than once criticized for failure to observe the same. While the
Supreme Court, in Kinney v. City of Joliet,' was willing to over-
look the fact that the appellant had not followed the statement of
facts with a statement of errors relied on for reversal, since the
order in which the brief presented the issues was not regarded as
being of jurisdictional importance, it did dismiss the appeal taken
in Harris v. Annunzio2 because the abstract filed there totally
failed to disclose the proceedings had in the trial court, upon
review under the Administrative Review Act, and the court de-
clined to search the record for this purpose.3 Under no circum-
stance, however, will the court permit the litigant, even when
95 345 Ill. App. 105, 102 N. E. (2d) 561 (1951).
96 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202, in part provides: "The party taking
such appeal shalZl give bond, to be approved by the clerk or the judge of the court
below." Italics added.
97 Sub. nom. Brown v. Hill, 346 Ill. App. 525, 105 N. E. (2d) 555 (1952).
98 Harrison v. Nelson, 96 Ill. App. 397 (1901).
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 259.38-39.
1411 Ill. 289, 103 N. E. (2d) 473 (1952).
2411 Ill. 124, 103 N. E. (2d) 477 (1952).
3 See, however, the decision of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District in
Ellet v. Wyatt, 345 Ill. App. 420, 103 N. E. (2d) 526 (1952), where the court
expressed a belief that the Supreme Court had begun to show a liberal tendency
which it felt bound to emulate in a case where it was claimed, on motion to dismiss
the appeal, that the abstract failed to disclose (1) the date of the judgment sought
to be reviewed, (2) the date and manner of serving notice of appeal, and (3) the
date of filing of the record, although the abstract did show that each of these acts
had occurred.
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acting pro se, to fill the records of the court with scandalous and
vituperative material. It did, therefore, in Biggs v. Spader,4
strike the brief and dismiss the appeal, albeit noting while it did
so that it had serious doubts as to the propriety of the judgment
from which the appeal had been taken and indicating that it might
have reversed the same had the question been argued in proper
fashion. 5
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Cases, other than in bankruptcy, involving unusual features of
law regarding the enforcement of judgments have been conspicuous
by their absence. The federal district court decision in Landers,
Frary & Clark v. Vischer Products Company6 would, however,
appear to be sufficiently pertinent to bear mention. The case was
one in which the plaintiff, in connection with a patent license, had
loaned the defendant company a large sum of money on unmatured
and unsecured notes. The principal defendant some time after-
ward realized that, with the greater portion of its income being
derived from royalties under the patent license, it was exposed to
a serious tax problem as a holding company, 7 so a reorganization
was arranged whereby it turned over its small-scale manufactur-
ing operations to another company, assigned its patents and
royalties to its shareholders as tenants in common, and then dis-
solved, but not before securing the promise of the transferee
corporation to assume its debts. The former shareholders, while
fully aware of the outstanding debt to the plaintiff, neither as-
sumed this debt nor did they formulate any plan for its liquidation.
Plaintiff then sought a declaratory judgment as to its rights and
particularly prayed for equitable relief. Although the court well
understood the law to be that the holder of an unmatured promis-
sory note, absent an acceleration clause, has no present cause of
4411 111. 42, 103 N. E. (2d) 104 (1952).
5 Notice might even be taken of the court's action in McCabe v. Hebner, 410 Ill.
557, 102 N. E. (2d) 794 (1952), wherein it taxed the appellant with all the costs
for having submitted an abstract of 1028 pages and a brief of 241 pages, in a case
where the appellant was said to have unnecessarily prolonged the litigation and
made the record excessively long, although the court had first contemplated refusing
to receive the brief at all.
6 104 F. Supp. 411 (1952).
7 26 U. S. C. A. § 500 et seq.
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action," it was of the opinion that the facts warranted equitable
relief against the constructively fraudulent transfer of the debtor's
property into the hands of the former shareholders, so an equi-
table lien was impressed thereon for plaintiff's benefit. That
decision accords both with the general rule9 and some earlier
Illinois cases'0 on the subject of creditors' rights. The novelty
of the case, if there is any, lies in the use of the modern declaratory
judgment procedure as a substitute for the old-fashioned creditor's
bill with its attendant formalities.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Significant cases in the field of criminal law divide about
equally into those dealing with substantive issues and those con-
cerning procedural points. In the first of these categories, men-
tion might be made of the fact that the 1874 statute, which pro-
hibits the unlawful possession of burglar's tools,' was construed
for the first time this year by the Supreme Court through the
medium of the case of People v. Taylor.2  The defendant, an
unemployed handyman, was arrested by police on suspicion while
walking through a neighborhood where burglaries had been fre-
quent. In his pocket at the time were a pair of pliers, a screw-
driver, and a pencil flashlight. He was convicted for a violation
of the statute in the trial court and the Supreme Court, on writ
of error, had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
tools possessed by the defendant came within the statutory pro-
hibition. The conviction was reversed, however, on the ground
the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to support
an inference regarding the presence of the necessary felonious
intention. The holding in People v. Beacham3 was distinguished
8 See 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, § 529.
9 First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 54 S. Ct. 298, 78 L. Ed. 465, 90
A. L. R. 391 (1934); Bankers Trust Co. v. Kilburn, 84 F. (2d) 401 (1936) ; South
Chester Tube Co. v. Naismith, 73 F. (2d) 13 (1934).
10 Bouton v. Smith, 113 11. 481 (1885); Dunphy v. Gorman, 29 Ill. App. 132
(1888).
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 87.
2410 Il. 469, 102 N. E. (2d) 529 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw
278.
3 358 I1. 373, 193 N. E. 205 (1934).
